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Bringing Compassion into the Province
of Judging: Justice Blackmun and the
Outsiders*
Pamela S. Karlan**
Hear the cases between your brethren, and judge righteously
between a man and his brother, and the stranger that is with him.
Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; ye shall hear the small
and the great alike; ye shall not be afraid of the face of any
man. . . .1

INTRODUCTION
On paper, Harry Blackmun seems the consummate insider—a
“White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Republican Rotarian Harvard Man
from the Suburbs”2 who currently holds the Supreme Court seat
once filled by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. But the further inside
the Establishment Justice Blackmun has moved, the more sensitive
he has become to the fact that “[T]here is another world ‘out
there,’”3 a world inhabited by the poor, the powerless, and the oppressed. No other Justice sitting on the Court today, and few in its
history, has done more to sear the conscience of the people, or his
or her Brethren, with the plight of “the unfortunate denizens of that
world, often frightened and forlorn.”4
This tribute to the Justice discusses his treatment of “outsiders”
as the distinctive, recurring theme that represents his major contribution to American law. While he was on the Court of Appeals,
* Originally published in 97 DICK. L. REV. 527 (1993).
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I thank Cate Stetson for her
research assistance, and Eben Moglen and Beth Heifetz for their comments and
suggestions. I clerked for Justice Blackmun in October Term 1985.
1. Deuteronomy 1:16-17.
2. Harold H. Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the
Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 51 (1985).
3. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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then-Judge Blackmun pioneered the application of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to
prison conditions.5 As a rookie on the Supreme Court, Justice
Blackmun became the first Justice since Chief Justice Stone to write
an opinion for the Court using Carolene Products’ famous footnote
4 to justify special constitutional protection for a “discrete and insular” minority.6 And, of course, Justice Blackmun is perhaps best
known to the general public as an impassioned defender of individual freedom of choice, for poor women and pregnant teenagers who
seek control over their reproductive lives, as well as for gay men
and lesbians.7 This essay explores the connection among the various strands of Justice Blackmun’s solicitude for those who differ in
ways “that touch the heart of the existing order.”8
II. BREAKFASTS

OF

CHAMPION

I have already alluded to the fact that Justice Blackmun occupies perhaps the most distinguished seat on the Court: one held earlier by Justices Story and Frankfurter, as well as the great Realists—
Justices Holmes and Cardozo. Since the days of the Realists, it has
often been said that “the law is what the judges had for breakfast.”9
I hardly want to suggest that Justice Blackmun is simply the sum
5. Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Blackmun: An Appreciation, 8 HAMLINE L.
REV. 20, 21 n. 3 (1985). For a discussion of Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir.1968), see infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
6. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). In Graham, Justice Blackmun used the concept to justify heightened scrutiny of laws discriminating against
aliens. See John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term—Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 7-8 (1978). For a discussion of
Graham, see infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of Justice Blackmun’s treatment of abortion and homosexuality, see infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
8. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
9. Despite extensive research, I have been unable to determine the originator
of this aphorism. Cf. ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS (1965)
(trying to trace the origin of the aphorism, “If I have seen farther than those who
came before me, it is because I sit on the shoulders of giants.”). The source in most
books of legal quotations seems to be the ever-prolific “Anonymous.” See, e.g., A
DICTIONARY OF LEGAL QUOTATIONS 85 (Simon James & Chantal Stebbings eds.,
1987). Cf. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 287
(Fred R. Shapiro ed. 1993) (attributing the phrase to Robert Hutchins’ criticism of
legal realism in The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, 7 AM. L. SCHOOL REV.
1051, 1054 (1934)). Perhaps the idea can ultimately be traced to the following exchange in the Pickwick Papers:
‘I wonder what the foreman of the jury, whoever he’ll be, has got for
breakfast,’ said Mr. Snodgrass. . . . ‘Ah!’ said Perker, ‘I hope he’s got a
good one.’ ‘Why so?’ inquired Mr. Pickwick. ‘Highly important—very important, my dear Sir,’ replied Perker. ‘A good, contented, well-

2017]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN

AND THE

OUTSIDERS

299

total of the thousands of scrambled eggs accompanied by an
equivalent number of slices of raisin toast and an ocean of coffee
that he has consumed during his daily breakfasts with his law clerks,
but we can gain at least a little insight into his compassionate, empathetic approach by looking at the early morning years of his life.10
The “other world out there” is where Justice Blackmun spent
his childhood, growing up in poor surroundings in St. Paul, Minnesota.11 His introduction to the world of power and privilege—his
stint as a scholarship student at Harvard College and Harvard Law
School—carried with it what must have been a daily reminder that
he was not entirely an insider. While his more affluent college classmates enjoyed the last years of the Roaring Twenties, he worked as
a janitor, a milkman, a handball court painter, and a boat driver for
the Harvard crew coach to cover living expenses that were not
defrayed by a tuition scholarship from the Harvard Club of Minnesota.12 Although his career after his summa cum laude graduation
from college has moved from triumph to triumph—partner at the
preeminent firm in the tonier of the Twin Cities, a decade as counsel to what he repeatedly reminds me is the foremost medical organization in the nation, his beloved Judge Sanborn’s seat on the
Eighth Circuit, and ultimately a place on the Supreme Court13—
one can discern in his work memories of the loneliness of being an
outsider, and a commitment to including the stranger within the institutional family.
breakfasted juryman, is a capital thing to get hold of. Discontented or
hungry jurymen, my dear Sir, always find for the plaintiff.’
CHARLES DICKENS, THE POSTHUMOUS PAPERS OF THE PICKWICK CLUB 449 (Heritage Press 1938) (1836).
10. For a warning against theorizing beyond one’s knowledge in Supreme
Court biographies, particularly while dealing with the subject of a Justice’s relationship to outsiders, see Eben Moglen, Jewishness and the American Constitutional Tradition: The Cases of Brandeis and Frankfurter, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 959
(1989) (reviewing ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE
PROMISED LAND (1988)).
11. See John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1983, § 6 (Magazine) at 20, 24 (“And because I grew up in poor surroundings, I know there’s another world out there that we sometimes forget about. . . .
We lived in a blue-collar neighborhood. . . . And we didn’t have very much, but
nobody complained because everybody was in the same state in our neighborhood.
And it didn’t do me any harm at all.”).
12. Id.
13. The Justice’s sense of the contingency of good fortune came with him to
the Court. Nominated after the defeats of Judges Haynesworth and Carswell, he
modestly refers to himself as “Old Number 3.” Id. Indeed, when Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy was confirmed for the seat vacated by Justice Lewis F. Powell after
the defeat of Robert Bork’s nomination and the withdrawal of Douglas Ginsburg’s, the Justice welcomed him to the Court with a humorous message, noting
their shared distinction as “Number 3’s.”
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III. THE STRANGERS WHO ARE WITH US: PRISONERS, ALIENS,
AND NATIVE AMERICANS
During the Term I spent with the Justice, my co-clerks and I
watched a television interview he was taping in his office. The interviewer asked him which of his opinions he was proudest of, expecting him to say Roe v. Wade.14 The Justice surprised him, by naming
instead one of his Eighth Circuit decisions, Jackson v. Bishop.15 Although Jackson was a relatively early case in a long judicial career,
it is, in many ways, quite typical of the Justice’s approach.
In Jackson, then-Judge Blackmun held that Arkansas’ practice
of whipping inmates for prison infractions violated the Eighth
Amendment:
[T]he use of the strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which, in this last third of the 20th century, runs afoul of the
Eighth Amendment; . . . the strap’s use, irrespective of any precautionary conditions which may be imposed, offends contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity and precepts of
civilization which we profess to possess; and . . . it also violates
. . . standards of good conscience and fundamental fairness. . . .16

Today, Jackson’s holding seems a routine application of welldeveloped principles, but in 1968 it was far from obvious. Judge
Blackmun, could not rely on well-established precedents;17 he had
to “glean” from earlier Supreme Court decisions a constitutional
commitment to “flexibility and improvement in standards of decency as society progresses and matures.”18 His belief that “broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.1968). See also Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983
and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade
Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1985) (noting the “pride” he takes in Jackson).
16. Jackson, 404 F.2d at 579.
17. Indeed, the Justice tells a poignant story along these lines about his clerkship with Judge Sanborn: the two men reviewed
a sad petition from a state prisoner complaining about [the] conditions of
his incarceration. The petition evoked sympathy, and we did sympathize.
But the almost inevitable conclusion at that time, less than 50 years ago,
was that the American prisoner’s problem was one solely within the discretion of the state prison authorities and that federal courts should not
and could not intervene. It was not even a close question.
Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717, 733
n. 104 (1983).
18. Jackson, 404 F.2d at 579. Cf. Harry A. Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma
Pauperis Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 359 (1967)
(“As in medicine . . . so in law, although more slowly, there is constant movement.
We should be aware of this, anticipate it, and not resent it.”).
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decency are useful and usable” in interpreting specific constitutional provisions19 lay at the heart of “one of the first, possibly the
first, appellate opinion[s] examining prison practices and holding
them unlawful under the eighth amendment.”20
Prison inmates may be the least sympathetic group of “outsiders” in our constitutional jurisprudence, since their banishment
from free society is the result of their willful criminal behavior.
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun has recognized that their very isolation paradoxically renders us particularly responsible for the conditions in which they must live.21 So, for example, in Cannon v.
Davidson22 Justice Blackmun argued that prison officials’ heedless
failure to protect a prisoner from attack by another inmate gave
rise to a cause of action under section 1983,23 precisely because of
the officials’ heightened responsibility:
When the State of New Jersey put Robert Davidson in its prison,
it stripped him of all means of self-protection. It forbade his access to a weapon. It forbade his fighting back. It blocked all avenues of escape. . . . [The State] therefore assumed some
responsibility to protect him from the dangers to which he was
exposed.24

Similarly, in United States v. Bailey25 the Justice dissented from
the Court’s holding that prisoners who have fled from intolerable
prison conditions are foreclosed from advancing a duress defense
unless they can show that they sought to surrender as soon as they
had escaped. He confronted his colleagues with the “atrocious and
inhuman conditions of prison life in America,”26 in an attempt to
shake them out of their “pious pronouncements fit for an ideal
world”27 about the real-life hell that all too many prisoners inhabit.
19. Jackson, 404 F.2d at 579. Of course, the same approach informs his treatment of privacy and due process interests as well. See, e.g., infra note 65 and notes
73-76 and accompanying text.
20. Arnold, supra note 5, at 21 n. 3.
21. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 423 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
22. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
23. Id. at 349-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of
the Justice’s perspective on section 1983 and prisoners’ rights cases, see Blackmun,
supra note 15. With characteristic modesty, the Justice writes that improvements in
prison conditions are “traceable in large part, and perhaps primarily, to actions
under § 1983,” id. at 21, without highlighting his central role in bringing about
judicial openness to such actions.
24. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 349, 350 (internal citations omitted).
25. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
26. Id. at 421-24.
27. Id. at 420.
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The Justice’s jurisprudential sense of connection with and responsibility towards prisoners is accompanied, as is so characteristic
of him, by a personal sense of connection as well. He is probably
the only Justice who regularly receives, and reads, a prison newspaper—in his case the Stillwater (Minn.) Prison Mirror. Indeed, the
Justice traveled to Minnesota to present an award to Robert Morgan, the inmate-editor of the Mirror.28 It is as true, I think, of individual justices as of society as a whole, that the treatment of
criminal offenders is one of “the measures by which the quality of
. . . civilization may be judged.”29 By this measure, Justice Blackmun has served as a deeply civilizing voice.
The Justice’s treatment of the civil and constitutional rights of
aliens was equally pathbreaking. When the Justice wrote Graham v.
Richardson,30 the contours of the equal protection clause looked
very different than they do today. The Justice’s invocation of strict
scrutiny for governmental classifications that discriminate against
aliens preceded the application of heightened scrutiny to genderbased classifications, the flowering of modern political process theory,31 or the contemporary understanding of the tiers of the equal
protection doctrine.32
Graham involved challenges to several state welfare programs
that either excluded aliens altogether or severely restricted their eligibility vis-à-vis the eligibility of United States citizens. The Court
could have decided the cases on pre-emption grounds: the federal
government having permitted these individuals to live in the United
States, the states lack the power to discriminate against them. In a
28. The unassuming Justice, of course, traveled in a smaller entourage than
Mr. Morgan, who attended under guard. Telephone interview with Wanda Martinson, Secretary to Justice Blackmun (Jan. 26, 1993).
The Justice has also included prison administrators and officials in the Justice
and Society seminar he and Norval Morris lead each summer at the Aspen Institute, both, I am sure, in the hope that they will educate the other participants
about the concerns of the world inside the walls and in the hope that the seminar
will press the prison officials to think critically about the relationship of broad
issues of justice and decency to their work.
29. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
30. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
31. See Koh, supra note 2, at 57. For accounts of modern process theory, see,
e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Michael Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991);
Michael Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747 (1991); Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721 (1991).
32. See, e.g. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Klarman, An Interpretive History, supra
note 31.
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variety of contexts, the Justice has been quite friendly to pre-emption arguments. But rather than relying on federalism, he understood that Graham involved claims of individual rights. He
recognized aliens as “a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’
minority for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate.”33
What makes aliens a discrete and insular group? For the Justice, there seem to be two answers. One answer focuses on the way
in which aliens are outsiders to the normal political processes by
which individuals can join together to demand equal treatment
from the government and to defend themselves against discrimination.34 The other answer focuses on the extent to which they are
likely to be the victims of irrational parochialism and prejudice.35
Just as important as his recognition of aliens’ outsider status and the
ensuing need for judicial protection is the Justice’s celebration of
the special contributions aliens can make to American life. They
represent “some of the diverse elements that are available, competent, and contributory to the richness of our society . . . .”36
For much of our history, we have treated Native Americans
worse than we have treated criminals or aliens. We alternated between exterminating them and exiling them on bleak reservations.
As the Justice noted, one of the “glaring defects” of the original
Constitution was its “complete exclusion” of Native Americans
from political life.37 It seems particularly fitting at a symposium
held in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the home of the great Jim Thorpe, to
discuss the Justice’s deep commitment to Native Americans.
Unlike his jurisprudence in prisoners’ rights, aliens’ rights, or
the right to privacy, the Justice’s writings on Native Americans are
not pathbreaking. Nevertheless, these writings shed a special light
33. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938)).
34. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 463 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that “California’s exclusion of . . . [aliens] from the position of
deputy probation officer stems solely from state parochialism and hostility towards
foreigners who have come to this country lawfully.”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 82 (1979) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (tracing New York’s ban on alien
schoolteachers to “the frantic and overreactive days of the First World War when
attitudes of parochialism and fear of the foreigner were the order of the day.”).
36. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 88; see also Koh, supra note 2, at 71 (finding that the
Justice’s opinion for the Court in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), reflects his
view “that resident aliens as a class . . . [have] something important as aliens to
contribute to American society”).
37. Harry A. Blackmun, John Jay and the Federalist Papers, 8 PACE L. REV.
237, 246 (1988). Indeed, as the Justice goes on to note, this exclusion has not yet
been fully remedied.
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on the centrality of his view that judgment requires both knowledge
and empathy. Perhaps in no other area has the Justice’s long-standing interest in American history intersected so completely with his
judicial approach.38 Although the Justice’s frequent opportunities
to write on these issues may have been somewhat fortuitous (the
folk wisdom being that he wrote so many Indian and tax cases
largely because of Chief Justice Burger’s somewhat hostile assignment policies),39 they were fortunate as well, because they gave him
an occasion for expressing his solidarity with a people exiled within
their own land.
The Justice’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians,40 for example, set out in painstaking detail how
the Sioux had been stripped of the Black Hills of South Dakota and
of their way of life.41 Strictly speaking, the detail might have been
unnecessary to resolve the technical issues of congressional intent,
the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction, or the principles of claim and issue preclusion that determined the outcome of the case. Nonetheless, it was critical to the Justice’s central mission: grounding the
judgment for the Sioux in the “moral debt” arising out of the dependence to which the United States had reduced a proud and selfreliant people.42 This sense of promises betrayed and our ensuing
responsibility was even more pointed in the elegiac tone of the Justice’s dissent in South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc.43 Justice Blackmun began from the premise that statutory ambiguities
are to be resolved in favor of Native Americans’ claims because of
“an altogether proper reluctance by the judiciary to assume that
Congress has chosen further to disadvantage a people whom our
Nation long ago reduced to a state of dependency.”44 He then advanced the more inclusionary claim that the interpretation of the
statute should take into account how “the Indians would have un38. Cf. Note, supra note 17, at 723 n. 36 (noting how the Justice’s opinions in
both Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), involved detailed historical research).
39. Cf. Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11
HAMLINE L. REV. 183, 197 (1988) (noting that according to one political scientist’s
measure, Justice Blackmun was ranked next to the bottom in the number of important cases he had been assigned).
40. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
41. See id. at 374-84; see also EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT
(1992).
42. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 397.
43. 476 U.S. 498 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 520.
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derstood” the relevant law.45 By moving from the abstract principle to the concrete inclusion of the Catawbas’ perspective, Justice
Blackmun moved from a sympathetic to an empathetic viewpoint.
As Judge Richard Arnold has remarked, the Justice’s writing reflects “a struggle to put oneself in other people’s shoes.”46
Most recently, the Justice has expressed this respect for the distinctive perspective of Native Americans in the notorious peyote
case, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith.47 The majority held that the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment did not preclude the application of a categorical ban
on peyote use to Native Americans who used the drug as part of a
religious ritual. Unlike the majority, which treated the respondents’
claims as if they involved some eccentric cultic practice, Justice
Blackmun’s dissent pressed the point that the respondents’ claims
had to be assessed in light of the special position occupied by Native Americans.48 Thus, he went beyond general First Amendment
free exercise theory to discuss the special role of ceremonial peyote
use for Native Americans.49 He argued that the Court’s decision
would perpetuate a pervasive history of religious persecution and
intolerance of Native American beliefs.50 The Justice demanded
that the Court take into account our as yet “unfulfilled and hollow
promise” of equal dignity and respect for Native Americans.51 Just
as the Justice’s treatment of prisoners is a measure of the man, so,
too, is his approach toward Native Americans, for as Felix Cohen
once wrote:
Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air
to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of
Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.52

Unlike the Smith majority, which seemed to believe “that the repression of minority religions is an ‘unavoidable consequence of
democratic government’”53 and that the legal suffocation of such
religions is the prerogative of the majority, Justice Blackmun recognizes that our democratic faith requires particular care for the relig45. Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
46. Arnold, supra note 5, at 24.
47. 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
48. See id. at 1621-22.
49. See id. at 1618-20, 1622.
50. See id. at 1622.
51. Id.
52. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
53. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ious faiths of those with whom we have so often broken our
political faith in the past.54
IV. RESPECTING ALL PERSONS IN JUDGMENT: POOR WOMEN,
PREGNANT TEENAGERS, AND GAYS AND LESBIANS
Justice Blackmun rightly views Roe v. Wade55 as “a landmark
in the emancipation of women.”56 After the Court’s decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,57 it
seems safe finally to say that at least some version of Roe is now
firmly embedded in American constitutional law.58 Nonetheless,
Justice Blackmun’s other abortion opinions remind us that the
emancipation of women is still incomplete, that there are in fact a
large number of women effectively barred from exercising the right
Roe seemed to promise them. Due to their poverty or fear, these
women live in “another world ‘out there,’ the existence of which the
Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize . . . .”59 The Justice’s central mission over the past generation
has been to confront the Court and the Nation with the lives of
these invisible women and to bring them inside Roe v. Wade’s protective circle.
This mission is made clear by examining two of the Justice’s
dissents. In Poelker v. Doe,60 the Court upheld St. Louis’ refusal to
perform nontherapeutic abortions in municipal hospitals. The majority treated the issue as simply one of governmental resource allocation, insisting that its holding did not restrict the right recognized
in Roe. But, as Justice Blackmun explained in his dissent, St. Louis’
policy was directed at “punitively impress[ing] upon a needy minority its own concepts of the socially desirable, the publicly acceptable, and the morally sound, with a touch of the devil-take-the54. See id. at 1622 (reflecting on the “unfulfilled and hollow promise” of religious tolerance for Native Americans); cf. Harry A. Blackmun, Movement and
Countermovement, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 747, 752-53 (1988-1989) (stating that “some
among us know the unease that often is felt when one lives as a member of a
minority in a culture and in an area dominated by another religious inclination”).
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. See Ruth Marcus, Author of Roe Remains Proud, Protective of It, WASH.
POST, April 20, 1992, at A1, A4 (quoting the Justice).
57. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
58. See id. at 2804 (stating that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should
be retained and once again reaffirmed”).
59. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Since
Beal, the Justice has often returned to this phrase in his dissents from the Court’s
restrictions on women’s freedom of choice. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 348-49 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam).
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hindmost.”61 Indeed, only the fact that poor women already lived
on the edge of society enabled St. Louis’ policy to have any meaningful effect.
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,62 the Justice’s attack on Ohio’s onerous parental-notification and judicialby-pass provisions rested precisely on the way in which the provisions exploited the estrangement of young women subjected to the
law and forced them to deal with “an unfamiliar and mystifying
court system on an intensely intimate matter.”63 The Justice highlighted how the provisions ignored the sad truth that many children
find themselves strangers even within their own families:
Sadly, not all children in our country are fortunate enough to be
members of loving families. For too many young pregnant
women, parental involvement in this most intimate decision
threatens harm, rather than promises comfort. The Court’s selective blindness to this stark social reality is bewildering and distressing. Lacking the protection that young people typically find
in their intimate family associations, these minors are desperately
in need of constitutional protection. The sexually or physically
abused minor may indeed be “lonely or even terrified,” not of
the abortion procedure, but of an abusive family member. The
Court’s placid reference to the “compassionate and mature” advice the minor will receive from within the family must seem an
unbelievable and cruel irony to those children trapped in violent
families.64

The Justice’s language, as well as his sentiments, confront us
with the condition of outsiders. Some children are excluded from
membership in loving families; others are trapped in private worlds
that society seems unwilling or unable to conquer.65 They find
61. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1977).
62. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
63. Id. at 527 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 536-37 (internal citations omitted).
65. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
DeShaney involved a § 1983 suit on behalf of Joshua DeShaney, who was beaten so
repeatedly and severely by his father that he suffered permanent brain damage. Id.
at 193. The suit claimed that the Department of Social Services was responsible
because it had knowingly left him in his father’s custody despite repeated warning
signals. Id. The Court held that Joshua had not been deprived of any “liberty interest” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because the state was not affirmatively responsible for his welfare. Id. at 195. In a short, and blistering, dissent, the
Justice first attacked the Court for “retreat[ing] into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing . . . the facts,” and then compared the majority to “the
antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves.” Id. at 212. In contrast to
the majority’s narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Blackmun
advanced a more capacious understanding: “Faced with the choice, I would adopt a
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themselves lonely even within what should be a supportive and nurturing private world. Therefore, courts and the Constitution must
step in to protect those who are cast outside the more private forms
of protection.
At the very outset of his abortion jurisprudence, Justice Blackmun quoted Justice Holmes’ statement that the Constitution “is
made for people of fundamentally differing views . . . .”66 In no area
of law has the Justice’s commitment to this principle been stronger
than in his willingness to extend the Constitution’s “promise that a
certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government”67 to the rights of gays and lesbians.
The Justice has identified the flaw in our constitutional reasoning as
lying “in the way we treat those who are not exactly like us, in the
way we treat those who do not behave as we do, in the way we treat
each other.”68 Indeed, the Justice’s language, far from distinguishing “us” from “them,” teaches us that when “we” mistreat “one
another” we are in fact mistreating ourselves.
The Justice’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick69 powerfully expresses his inclusive and empathetic constitutional vision. From his
opening line that “[T]his case is no more about ‘a fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy,’ as the Court purports to declare
than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about a fundamental
right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth.”70 Justice
Blackmun sought to show that the rights of homosexuals cannot be

‘sympathetic’ reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice
and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging.”
Id. at 190 (emphasis added). To drive home this sense in which he sought to erase
the boundary, he ended: “Poor Joshua! . . . [A]bandoned by respondents who
placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going
on, and yet did essentially nothing. . . .” Id.
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
67. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
68. Blackmun, supra note 37, at 247.
69. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
70. Id. at 199 (internal citations omitted).
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disengaged from the rights of all other Americans.71 The Court’s
holding, he emphasized, restricts the rights “all individuals have.”72
Justice Blackmun’s central message is tolerance:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests,
in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many “right”
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the
richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds. . . . A necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to
choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that
different individuals will make different choices.73

And his conclusion—that “depriving individuals of the right to
choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships
poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our
Nation’s history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever
do”74—drives home a point the Justice once made in paraphrasing
Pogo: “‘We have met the enemy and he is us,’ he is us.”75 When we
deny “outsiders” the constitutional dignity we accord to ourselves,
we are our own worst foes. As Harold Koh once wrote in discussing
the wisdom of the Justice’s treatment of aliens:
Tolerance of the participation of others in community life is a
value as fully embodied in the notion of citizenship as participation itself. Thus, citizens act more truly as citizens when they accord a stranger in their midst “a generous and ascending scale of
71. See, e.g., id. at 200 (rejecting the Court’s assumption that “homosexuals
are so different from other citizens that their lives may be controlled in a way that
would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citizens”).
In trying to locate gays among the groups entitled to protection of their divergence from the majority, the Justice analogized them to religious minorities, see id.
206 (relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)) (the Amish); id. at 211
(relying on West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943))
(Jehovah’s Witnesses), as well as racial ones, see id. at 210 (relying on Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967)).
72. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 205-06. The Justice’s personal espousal of this philosophy is reflected in a comment he made to Bill Moyers: although the Justice still believed
sodomy was wrong, and “I would be distressed to see my children indulge in it . . .
but who am I to say? I recognize my limitations.” Wasby, supra note 39, at 189 n.
27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214.
75. Harry Blackmun, Some Goals of Legal Education, 1 OHIO N.L. REV. 401,
405 (1974) (emphasis supplied by Justice Blackmun).
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rights as he increases his identity with our society,” than when
they limit the participation of aliens in community life.76

V. CONCLUSION
The judicial enterprise is a profoundly lonely business.77 Its
very loneliness, which some judges have used as an excuse for escaping the messiness and pain of the world, can deepen the reservoirs of empathy in a sensitive person. This, I think, is what has
happened to Justice Blackmun. He has transformed the knowledge
and experience that have come his way into judgment, truly taking
to heart Justice Holmes’ observation that:
If [a lawyer] is a man of high ambition, he must leave even his
fellow adventurers and go forth into a deeper solitude and
greater trials . . . . In plain words, he must face the loneliness of
original work. No one can cut new paths in company. He does
that alone.78

I know that Justice Blackmun does not view himself as an ambitious man, let alone a man of “high ambition.” Nevertheless, he
truly has cut new paths for prisoners, aliens, women, and gays. We
would fail to have learned all that his work teaches if we do not
recognize that he has cut new paths for us all.

76. Koh, supra note 2, at 95 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770
(1950)).
77. See, e.g., Blackmun, supra note 75, at 405-06; Jenkins, supra note 11, at 61.
78. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Brown University—Commencement 1897, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 164, 165 (1920) (quoted in Blackmun, supra note 75,
at 405-06).

